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Address
Environmental Decisionmaking: Judicial and
Political Review
David Sive
SEVERAL YEARS AGO, at the time of the first explosion of
environmental law, I went to the traditional fountains and
fountainheads of administrative law, and attempted to answer the
question: Is the scope of judicial review of environmental admin-
istrative action broader than, or different from, judicial review in
other fields of administrative action?' The conclusion was, per-
haps, an emotional one because the classical struggles to save vari-
ous places-the Grand Canyon,' Storm King Mountain,'
Rainbow Bridge,4 and others-were just beginning. Environmen-
tal review really required something more than the usual look by
courts at administrative action. I saw then that there were three
grounds on which to base the need for expansive review. First, I
thought that the value judgments which are so often required to
resolve environmental cases called more for the talents and train-
ing of courts and judges than that of administrators.5 Second, the
* B.A. (1943), Brooklyn College; LL.B. (1948), Columbia University. The author is a
member of the law firm Winer, Neuburger & Sive in New York, New York. He is admitted
to the New York Bar. This article is based upon an address to the student body in the
course of a visit to the Case Western Reserve University Law School.
The author wishes to thank Clifford M. Wiener for his valuable assistance in the prep-
aration of this article.
1. See Sive, Foreword Roles and Rules in Environmental Decisionmaking, 62 IoWA
L. REv. 637 (1977); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. RV. 612 (1970).
2. See Hano, The Battle ofthe Grand Canyon, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1965, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 56; id., Dec. 19, 1965, § 1, at 57, col. 2; id., May 2, 1966, at 42, col. 1.
3. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. deniedsub norm Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preser-
vation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
4. See Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1171 (1974).
5. See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness o 4dmin-
istrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 629-30 (1970).
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very newness of some of the statutes which began to flood us at
the end of the 1960's6 frequently generated classical questions of
law to be reviewed de novo by the courts.7 Finally, the importance
of the rights asserted, due to the irrevocable impact of environ-
mental decisions, seemed to justify broader judicial review.8
The question whether environmental decisionmaking in gen-
eral is different was one that we activists answered first emotion-
ally, and later, rationally. We were led by people like Rachel
Carson,9 David Brower, t0 and hikers in the Hudson River high-
lands who importuned us to save the birds and other voices of
spring from DDT, the Grand Canyon from dam builders, and
Storm King Mountain from the Consolidated Edison Company.
We viewed as heresy any claims that the fate of the environment
must somehow be determined in the same manner as in other so-
cial movements-by the same kind of bargain-striking in the po-
litical process, and by application of the traditional notions of the
scope of judicial review.
Several distinct events, both judicial and nonjudicial, suggest
to me that the time is ripe to consider again whether environmen-
tal decisionmaking is different, or should be different, or is simply
a movement some of us feel deeply about as others feel toward
other equally important social movements. " About two years ago,
in Kleppe v. Sierra Club,2 the Supreme Court held that a govern-
mental agency's determination to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement in its presumed field of expertise must be upheld
6. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 US.C. §§ 4321-
4347 (1976).
7. See Sive, supra note 5, at 625-26, 630.
8. Id. at 643.
9. See R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
10. Former Executive Director of the Sierra Club; see N.Y. Times, May 8, 1967, at 67,
col. 1.
11. 1 have not been the only one, and hardly even one of the most important ones, to
examine environmental decisionmaking in recent months. A vast outpouring of learning
has come from a study by the Committee on Environmental Decisionmaking of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, conducted as part of a multimillion dollar research project
commissioned by the EPA. Decisionmaking in the Environmental Protection Agency (pub-
lished by the National Academy of Sciences, 1977). The subject also proliferates in the law
reviews and other learned literature. See, e.g., Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REy. 509 (1974); Smith, The Environment and the
Judiciary. .4 Needfor Co-operation or Reorm?, 3 ENVT'L. AFF. 627 (1974); Symposium,
Environmental Decision-Making: The Agencies versus the Courts, 7 NAT. RES. LAW. 337
(1974).
12. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
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unless its determination is arbitrary and capricious.13 Recently, in
the Adirondack Mountains, where passions run high concerning
New York State's first experience with land use controls,1 4
bumper stickers advise, "Are you hungry? Eat an environmental-
ist!" And, at both Seabrook, New Hampshire, and Kennedy Air-
port, New York, opponents of a nuclear power plant 5 and of
Concorde landings1 6 invoke the classical tenets of civil disobedi-
ence to supplement, or perhaps replace, the finely spun forensics
and scholarship of their attorneys. These examples of current en-
vironmental activity on different levels serve to focus the attention
of courts on the relationship of the adversary process to three
other decisionmaking processes: 1) the administrative process, 17 2)
the political process,'8 and 3) the process of direct citizen action.19
At the outset of this address let me offer an answer to the ques-
tion I have posed2 -- Yes, environmental review is still broader,
but less than it has been.
13. Id. at 412.
14. [I]n 1968, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller created the Temporary Study
Commission on the Future of the Adirondacks. In 1971, despite strong opposition
from Park residents, New York State accepted the recommendations contained in
the Report of the Commission by enacting the Adirondack Park Agency Act
[N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 800-19 (McKinney Supp. 1978)].
The Act ... represents a comprehensive and pioneering endeavor to provide
land use planning for the Adirondack Park on a regional basis. Treating the re-
gion as a whole, the legislation is designed to provide a land use plan for the Park
that will allow for the development and growth of local communities in a manner
consistent with the protection and preservation of the entire region as a natural
environmental resource.
Savage & Sierchio, The Adirondack ParkAgencyAct:A Regional Land Use Plan Confronts
"The Taking Issue," 40 ALB. L. REV. 447, 448 (1976). For a discussion of the background,
substance, and operation of the Act, see Booth, The Adirondack Park Agency Act: A Chal-
lenge in Regional Land Use Planning, 43 GEO. WASH. U.L. REV. 612 (1975).
15. See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1977, § I, at 26, col. 1; id., May 2, 1977, at 1, col. 2; id.,
May 3, 1977, at 20, col. 1. For a discussion of environmentalists, civil disobedience, and the
law, see generally Sive, Seabrook, Concorde and Law, id., July 16, 1977, at 21, col. 2.
16. See id., April 17, 1977, § 1, at 19, col. 1; id., April 18, 1977, at 54, col. 1; id., May
16, 1977, at 57, coL 1; id., Oct. 7, 1977, at 1, col. 1; id., Nov. 21, 1977, at 40, col. I.
17. See notes 20-41 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 42-63 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 64-65 infra and accompanying text.
20. With all due candor, I must qualify my claim of expertise: 1) 1 am a litigator and
secondarily an observer-, although I hope I am a fair observer, I may confuse what is with
what ought to be; and 2) my legal expertise may be doubtful, for as in a war the infantry in
the front lines always knows far less about who is winning than the quartermaster at com-
mand headquarters; so, too, one in the litigating trenches may know far less about the big
picture than the scholars and commentators.
1978]
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To begin with the latter half of that conclusion, there are three
reasons why I think the difference has narrowed. One is that, with
the passage of time and the maturing of environmental law, the
proportion of important cases determined strictly by defining legal
concepts, independent of findings of fact, has become smaller; that
is, fewer important cases now hinge on the meaning of statutory
phrases, such as "dike,"'" "navigable waters,"22 and "major fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment. ' 23 It is also clear that a greater proportion of the cases
are now determined upon issues of fact at trial rather than upon
pretrial motions.24 Included in these cases are the NEPA cases,
which comprise a sizeable fraction of all environmental litigation.
These cases more often now involve the sufficiency rather than the
necessity of environmental impact statements.25 Since determining
the sufficiency of environmental impact statements often requires
testimony of expert witnesses, submission of exhibits, and other
evidentiary processes, courts are more commonly faced with issues
of fact rather than law, and thus more of these cases proceed to
trial.
Perhaps of greater significance is that, as time has gone on, the
important cases being litigated have become evenly divided be-
tween those in which the environmental interests are seeking
broader review and those in which their adversaries, to whom I
refer as the "developmental interests," are seeking broader review.
The situation is aptly described by Kenneth Boulding, one of our
great economists and a National Academy of Sciences energy
panelist, who once quipped to me that one of the things that
makes environmental law interesting is the fact that the rich de-
velopmental interests have had the effrontery to use the tech-
21. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 106 (2d
Cir.), (construing the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 9, 33 U.S.C. § 401
(1970)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1971) (construing the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)).
23. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cookeville, 381 F. Supp. 100, 109-11 (M.D. Tenn. 1974)
(construing NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970)). See generally Comment,
Environmental Law.- What is "Major" in "Major FederalAction?" Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974), 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 485 (1975).
24. This conclusion is based on a comparison between the approximately 140 cases
summarized in the 1971 volume of the Environmental Law Reporter and the approxi-
mately 180 cases summarized in the 1977 volume.
25. Eg., County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1238 (1978).
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niques that they learned from the poor environmentalists.26 The
importance of this development is demonstrated very dramatically
in the brief for the respondents27 in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.28 Although
the Supreme Court recently reversed the decision of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, which had held that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission may not license nuclear power stations
until it more fully considers the environmental effects of reproces-
sing and waste disposal, the framework of the Natural Resources
Defense Council's (NRDC) argument is illustrative of the growing
phenomenon in environmental cases. The environmentalists ar-
gued that the administrative action did not meet the standard of
reasoned decisionmaking within the requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and therefore should be overturned as arbi-
trary and capricious.29 What authorities did the NRDC cite,
however, to support its point that "The Law of Administrative
Procedure Requires an Agency to Engage in Reasoned Decision-
making? '30 The NRDC cited eight environmental cases and five
cases from other areas of administrative decisionmaking.3 ' Of the
eight environmental cases, only two, Scenic Hudson Preservation
26. See also Hill, Turning the Tables-Businesses Are Finding Environmental Laws
Can Be Useful To Them, Wall St. J., June 9, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
27. Brief for Respondents, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
28. 435 U.S. 519 (1978), rev g 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
29. Section 10(e)(B)(l) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(1976), requires a reviewing court to set aside any action of an administrative agency that it
finds to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion. ... In decisions spanning more
than 30 years, the Supreme Court has construed § 10(e)(B)(1) to require a method of rea-
soned decisionmaking. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
30. Brief for Respondents, supra note 27, at 29.
31. Id. at 30-32. The eight environmental cases are: Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th
Cir. 1976); Hooker Chem. Co. v. Train, 537 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1976); South Terminal Co. v.
EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974); Portland
Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. deniedsub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference,
384 U.S. 941 (1966). The six cases from other administrative areas are: Camp v. Pitts, 411
U.S. 138 (1973); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962); SEC v.
Chenery, 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Greater Boston TV v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
420 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Isbrantsen Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Conference v. Federal Power Commission3 2 and Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volp, 33 are cases in which the environnen-
tal interests were seeking to expand the scope of review and to
secure greater adversarial procedural rights at the administrative
level. In six of the eight cases, the developmental interests were
seeking the broader scope of review or greater adversarial rights,
or both, and each involved review of EPA action. Of the six EPA
cases cited by the NRDC, the most important is one of the first in
which the environmentalists' shoe was put on the developmental-
ists' foot-International Harvester v. Ruckelshau. 4 The reason
why the cases are almost evenly divided now is simply that a tre-
mendous amount of environmental litigation involves EPA deter-
minations, and to the extent that the EPA is far more frequently
pro-environment, because that is its mission, the people seeking to
expand review and seeking greater adversarial rights are the de-
velopmental interests. Therefore, there is less difference than
before between environmental review and other judicial review,
since a disparity no longer exists between the number of cases in
which those in favor of review, as opposed to their adversaries, are
seeking its expansion.
Despite my prejudices, I believe that it has become evident
that the EPA has grown in expertise. This development, which
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has quite correctly stated is the
most important implicit factor defiming the scope of court re-
view, 5 is the third major factor which I think has narrowed the
difference between the scope of environmental review and
nonenvironmental review. In 1965, to speak to a Federal Power
Commissioner about the subtleties of the beauty of Storm King
Mountain, or to an Interior Department agent about the beauty of
Rainbow Bridge, was a very difficult thing. Neither had the requi-
32. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
33. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
34. 478 F.2d 615, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In International Harvester, the court set aside
an order requiring new automobiles to be equipped with catalytic converters. Perhaps the
first significant case in which the tables were turned is National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.), afft'd, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971), in which the National
Helium Corporation complained that Secretary Morton improperly terminated a purchase
contract without making an environmental impact statement in accordance with NEPA,
§ 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
35. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.09 (1958).
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site expertise because such matters had never come before them.
Those agencies do have expertise now, principally because a very
large number of lawyers and other professionals who have been
trained since the environmental movement began are now within
those agencies.36 The courts, I think, properly respect that exper-
tise. A clear example is Kleppe v. Sierra Club,37 in which the
Supreme Court relied primarily upon the expertise of the Depart-
ment of the Interior in sustaining its determination that a program
environmental impact statement covering the effects of proposed
coal mining was not necessary for the entire Northern Great
Plains region.3" The Court reasoned that the Department of the
Interior was expert in dividing up the region for impact statement
purposes--expert not only in the technical aspects of geography
and geology, but also expert generally in considering all environ-
mental factors. The Department of the Interior is certainly a good
illustration of the change of outlook and growth of expertise since
the mid 1960's.
Here of course one can argue that the Department acts with
expertise when its decisions are liked and without it when its deci-
sions are not liked. But it seems to me that if expertise is really the
critical factor, the environmentalists may have an edge. The ex-
pert agency most frequently subject to review of environmental
decisions is the EPA. To the extent that other agencies may not
match the environmental expertise of the EPA, the environmen-
talists may have an advantage because the EPA was created to
respond to environmental concerns.
For these three reasons, the difference between the scope of
environmental review and nonenvironmental review has lessened.
A difference still exists, however, and I think the best explanation
for this was provided in the text of an address by Judge James L.
Oakes, of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
The first such tentative conclusion, or, better, working hy-
pothesis, is that, despite many links to the past, environmental
law is in a real sense qualitatively different from other areas of
administrative, regulatory, or public law. Because life itself is
involved, there is no other area that I can think of that requires
such a complex balancing of so many subtle relationships. An
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ratemaking decision,
36. This observation includes agencies such as the Army Corps of Eiigineers and the
Federal Power Commission, or any other agencies which have formerly been classified as
anti-environmental.
37. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
38. Id. at 412-14.
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a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) television li-
censing decision-these and similar regulatory decisions have
several dimensions, but a relatively finite number. By contrast,
the number of dimensions to many environmental questions is
almost staggering. It is not enough to balance economic effects
against human health effects, or the need for a structure against
its unsightliness.39
Judge Oakes continues with a comparison of the complexi-
ties,4° and I suppose his conclusion is arguable. Some might make
the same argument for decisions in other fields; for example, an
FCC determination might involve the quality of public programs,
civil rights, and other similar issues. I think I agree with Judge
Oakes that environmental decisions differ because of their com-
plexity, but I do not mean to say that they are more important. I
will only go so far as to say that in this particular area there is a
great importance which seems to arise out of the irrevocable na-
ture of the decisions in environmental cases. I once suggested that
in environmental cases more than in other fields, including the
civil liberties field, the effect of a court's determination is more
irrevocable4' than in a case in which, for example, a court makes a
determination requiring some shade of opinion in the problems of
the separation of church and state. I still believe that is true be-
cause a decision dealing with a problem of the latter type can be
done or undone by a court which has moved to the left or right, or
however courts move. But when a determination is made to ap-
propriate a major physical resource, it virtually never can be un-
done, at least not within our lifetime or that of a few generations
to follow.
This leads to the second aspect of our inquiry-the relation-
ship of the judicial process to the political process. By the political
process I mean the process by which- legislation is enacted, the
whole process of public debate of political issues, including the
processes by which both state and federal legislators are elected.
In my opinion, the most fascinating and also the most trouble-
some aspect of environmental decisionmaking lies here. I can
liken its quality to some advice Professor James MacDonald, a
witty friend of mine at the University of Wisconsin Law School,
once gave me on identifying an appropriate topic for student dis-
cussion: "No problem is worth extended discussion unless it has
no solution." By this criterion, the problems of the relationship
39. Oakes, Substantive JudicialReview in Environmental Law, 7 ENVT'L L. REp. 50029,
50029 (1977).
40. Id. at 50033.
41. Sive, supra note 5, at 643.
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between judge-made environmental law and politics are truly
worthy of discussion. Here again I think the relationship is differ-
ent in the environmental area than in other areas.
At the beginning of the environmental movement we thought
that environmental decisionmaking was indeed so different in
kind and importance that we romanticized our concepts of the re-
lationship between man and nature into theories of a constitu-
tional right to a clean and healthy environment.42 Such a right, we
loosely argued, was one of those that James Madison and his fel-
low Federalists had deposited into the catchall known as the
Ninth Amendment. Like the right of privacy, some of us theo-
rized, it was within the constitutional "penumbra" of substantive
due process announced in Griswold v. Connecticut43 For many
reasons we did not find it necessary to take to the streets, to the
fields, or to other avenues outside the legal process, in the manner
of civil rights or peace advocates. I think the principal reason is
that environmental causes were traditionally espoused by highly
educated, white, upper-middle class persons, which is one of the
burdens we bear today. We chuckled at the occasional tearing
down, by nonlawyers, of billboards in the dead of night. Holding
ourselves as being beyond all that, we went to the courts and the
legislatures.
Today, by contrast, there are a large number of important con-
troversies which are carried on in both the environmental litigat-
ing field and the political arena. The disputes involving
nondegradation, 44 the Alaska Pipeline,45 nuclear waste dispo-
42. See D. Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment: Progress Along a Constitu-
tional Avenue (a paper submitted to the Sept. 11-12, 1969 Conference on Law and the
Environment, sponsored by the Conservation Foundation, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter
cited as the "Warrenton Conference"]. It was probably here that the term "environmental
law" was invented.
43. 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965); see Roberts, supra note 42. Not only has there been a
push for recognition that a clean environment is constitutionally guaranteed, but also some
have argued that natural objects should be given standing to sue to protect their survival.
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegalRightsfor Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. 450 (1972). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,741-53 (1972), Justice Douglas
argued that Mineral King Valley should have been the plaintiff in the suit to simplify
confusion surrounding the standing issue in environmental cases. Justice Douglas likened
such conferral of standing to the recognition of legal status to other inanimate objects such
as ships and corporations. Id. at 741-42.
44. Hines, 4 Decade f Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic
Pursuit of Clear 4ir and Clean Water, 62 IowA L. REv. 643 (1977).
45. See generaly Dominick & Brody, The 41aska Ppeline: Wilderness Society v.
Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM. U.L. Rav. 337 (1973).
1978]-
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sal,46 transportation control plans,47 and clearcutting48 provide
only a few examples. One of the major problems that arises from
having both the political process and the legal process work on the
same matters at the same time is the frequency of inconsistent and
reversible decisions.
About twelve years ago I was involved in such a situation,
when I experienced losing in court but winning the larger war.
The war was a relatively minor one-just the desire of park as-
sociations, environmentalists, and certain storeowners in the area,
including the Atlantic Chapter of the Sierra Club and Tiffany's, to
prevent the construction of a cafe at the southeast corner of Cen-
tral Park in Manhattan.49 After four years of litigation, on issues
including the definition of a "park,"5 and the public trust ques-
tion,5' the environmentalists lost in New York's highest court.
However, Tom Hoving, then recently appointed by Mayor Lind-
say as Parks Commissioner and the son of one of the plaintiff
storeowners, vetoed the plans for the cafe. Conversely, I suppose
the biggest battle the environmentalists won in the courts and then
lost in politics was the much more important one involving the
Alaska Pipeline. 2 First, Congress nullified the injunction order of
the court of appeals 53 by legalizing a wider corridor for the pipe-
46. See, e.g., West Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975); Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 433 F. Supp.
1235 (E.D. Tex. 1977). See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PUB. LANDS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., CLEARCUTTING ON
FEDERAL TIMBERLANDS (Comm. Print 1972); Hearings on Establishment of a Comm'n to
Investigate Clearcutting of Timber on Pub. Lands Before the Subcommt on Forests of the
House Comm on Agriculture, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
47. See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Clean Air Act §
110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1976).
48. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
49. 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 11 N.Y.2d 918, 183 N.E.2d 77, 228
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1962).
50. See 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 40 Misc. 2d 183, 193, 242 N.Y.S.2d
961, 971 (1963), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 221, 205 N.E.2d 850, 257 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1965).
51. Id. at 186-94, 242 N.Y.S.2d 964-72. See also 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New
York, 13 App. Div. 2d 733, 733-34, 215 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (1961). The public trust issue
focuses on whether a government may alienate trust property by conveying it to a private
owner and whether the government may effect changes in the use to which that property
has been devoted. See generally Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970).
52. See generally Dominick & Brody, supra note 45.
53. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973).
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line.54 Then, by the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Agnew, the
Senate rendered unnecessary the court's determination of whether
the environmental impact statement was insufficient by passing
the enabling act for the pipeline.
I suppose what injects controversy into the political process is
that it involves the interests of a large number of people. Despite
the frequency with which environmental controversies are in-
volved in the political process, the fact that they involve such
widely held interests may render them more worthy of judicial
determination than those controversies involving only a small,
discrete number of interested persons.
Environmental decisionmaking, therefore, raises another
problem related to the political process: the overloading of the
federal courts with too many of our social and economic
problems. This recalls de Tocqueville, who first observed that we
ultimately bring everything to the courts seeking resolution. 6
Chief Justice Burger has frequently commented on the problem,57
but I am afraid I have no solution to offer him. To some extent I
share his viewpoint that we must use means other than courts for
certain types of dispute resolution; for example, the issue whether
a girl as well as a boy should be able to play shortstop. On the
other hand, it is we environmental advocates who have expanded
standing and judicial cognizance of noneconomic rights59 and
have thus supplied the law and form books to the Little League
54. Federal Lands Right-of-Way Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973)
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. V 1975)).
55. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584-90
(1973) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (Supp. V 1975)).
56. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY rN AMERICA 290 (Bradley ed. 1954).
57. See, ag., Chief Justice' YearendlReport, 1977, 64 A.B.AJ. 211 (1978); Chief Jus-
lice Burger'r 1977Report to the American Bar Association, 63 id. 504 (1977); The Direction
of the Administration of Justice, 62 id. 727 (1976); Annual Report on the State of the Judici-
ary, id. at 443; Chief Justice Burger Issues Yearend Report, id. at 189; The State of the
Judiciary-1975, 61 id. 439 (1975); Chief Justice Burger Calls for Action on Several
Proposals, id. at 303.
58. See Fortin v. Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344 (Ist Cir. 1975); Magill v.
Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 497 F.2d
921 (3rd Cir. 1974); Rappaport v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 545 (D. Del.
1975).
59. West Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir.
1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Conrn'n, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. deniedsub nom. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302
F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
1978]
838 CASE WESTERN PESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:827
litigants. I will confess that perhaps my view is a little provincial,
in that the father may claim that his interest in protecting his
daughter's right to play shortstop is just as important as an interest
of mine in gazing at a scenic mountain without a microwave tower
on top of it. The only opinion that I have enough confidence to
state about this problem is that if something should be done about
it, the proper solution is neither to narrow judicial review or rights
of standing, nor is it to discriminate against the cases in which
tremendous numbers of people have perhaps a small interest, as in
United States v. SCRAP 60 Let there be an informed and enlight-
ened judgment, recognizing that some of the newer environmental
values are equally important as some of the traditional economic
values. Let us not fall back into pre-Baker v. Carr6 concepts of
political questions and get lost in what is a "case or contro-
versy." 62
. All of this goes without even mentioning many of the ethical
problems for attorneys, problems of the use of the court system
solely to gain publicity and thereby influence legislation and the
use of abusive discovery tactics in order to effect delay. This type
of politicization perhaps arises out of the inherent drama and pub-
lic attention given to court cases. These problems have been ade-
quately discussed elsewhere.
63
Finally, I address the third aspect of environmental decision-
making which I have mentioned; namely, the relationship of the
courts to direct citizen action-or what we call "self-help" in torts
and "civil disobedience" in political science. Again, the question is
60. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). In SCRAP the United States Supreme Court held that vari-
ous environmental groups, including Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP) and the Environmental Defense Fund, were persons "aggrieved" within the
meaning of § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), and therefore
they had standing to sue. 412 U.S. at 683-90.
61. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). This case recognized that the mere fact that a suit seeks pro-
tection of a political right does not mean that it presents a nonjusticiable "political ques-
tion." The Court thus explained the lower court's misguided reliance on Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, and "subsequent per curiam cases." 369 U.S. 186, 208-09 & n.29
(1962).
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See L. JAFFE & L. TRIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
(1971) (where the authors ask the reader to consider: "One of the problems raised by this
section on Judicial Review is whether Sive's emphasis on the potential of judicial review is
sound. Keep this in mind." Id. at 619); Sive, supra note 5, at 650-51.
63. For a discussion where the author feels there are no ethical dilemmas, see Like,
Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "Wo- Win" Proceeding,
13 ATOM. ENERGY L.J. 1 (1971); 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1971). Contra, Sive, supra note 5,
at 617-19; D. Sive, Securing, Examining, and Cross Examining Expert Witnesses in Envi-
ronmental Cases (a paper submitted to the "Warrenton Conference," supra note 42). See
generally, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5), EC 7-28, DR
7-101(A),(B) (1975).
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whether the relationship of the two processes in the environmental
area is different from that in other areas. While thinking about the
recent demonstrations at Kennedy Airport concerning the Con-
corde, and the seizure of a nuclear plant at Seabrook, New Hamp-
shire,64  have asked myself why environmentalists don't do what
civil rights advocates, women's rights partisans, and gay activists
do to dramatize or enforce their claims, including some of the
things which are-perish the thought-illegal? One can well con-
template how much poorer America would be if Thoreau, on the
afternoon before the evening that he spent in jail, had consulted
and heeded the probable advice of a tax expert of one of Boston's
great law firms. And how much poorer we would be if Martin
Luther King, Jr. had heeded the trespass sections of the Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts instead of staying beyond his allowed
time at the Jackson, Mississippi, lunch counters!
Certainly we environmentalists believe that our laws are high-
ly moral. One problem, it seems, is that in many cases we are not
in a position to assert our view by positive action. The civil rights
protesters can often assert their rights by simply exercising what
they believe to be their privilege; for example, attending schools
from which they have been excluded or refusing to move to the
back of a bus. Environmentalists, on the other hand, cannot de-
pollute a stream or mass-produce emission control devices. Ironi-
cally, it seems that the developmentalists are the ones who are best
able to directly demonstrate for their rights, by heedlessly going
forward with their projects.65
Second, I think that the environmental movement, more than
any other social movement in my adult lifetime, has been born
and bred in the courts. An overwhelming portion of all environ-
mental law is not only made in the courts but in suits instituted by
national environmental corporate law firms-the Sierra Club, the
Legal Defense Fund, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the
Natural Resources Defense Council-whose principal function is
litigation.
Furthermore, lawyers who are involved in the litigating proc-
ess generally believe in the rule of law, even if it is only because of
a simple need to defend their usefulness. Although such a strict
64. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of the economic consequences of this fact, see Junger, A Recipe
for Bad Water: Welfare Economics and Nuisance Law Mixed Well, 27 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 3, 224-27 (1976).
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belief in legal principle may reflect a very real professional pro-
vincialism, I think that it would threaten lawyers' credibility and
perhaps the hard-won standing of their environmental clients, if
they turned to supporting civil disobedience when they lose and
proclaiming the rule of law when they win.
This may seem like a renunciation of the godfather of environ-
mentalists, Thoreau. Another good environmentalist, Walt Whit-
man,6 6 and a well-known authority in other diverse areas of social
policy, William Shakespeare, both said that we would be better
off without lawyers.67 I do not believe it to be such a renunciation.
Thoreau was not a trustee of the Environmental Defense Fund; he
cherished and kept pollution-free his Walden Pond without de-
claratory judgment or mandamus actions. Nor am I saying to the
midnight feller of billboards that he must either stop or sue in the
daytime. I do not have the expertise to make such a judgment, but
rather, as one of a group of litigating lawyers who owe so much to
the integrity of the process which they have used to great advan-
tage, and who owe to it a certain gracious acceptance when they
lose, I refer to sociologists and clergymen the emerging question
of the relationship of environmental adjudication to the non-legal
process of civil disobedience.
And so, to the question whether environmental decisionmak-
ing is still different, my answer is yes, it is different, because of a
variety of interrelationships with the judicial administrative proc-
ess, the political process, and direct citizen action. The difference
in the qualitative character of judicial review of environmental
decisionmaking still stems from three aspects:
(1) The value judgments present in so many environmental
cases "call more for the talents and training of the courts and
judges than for those of the ... administrators"; (2) the rela-
tive youth of environmental law and the consequent necessity
to define new terms and concepts and to redefte old ones jus-
tify greater judicial participation; and (3) the importance of the
rights asserted in environmental cases, arising out of the irrevo-
cable impact of environmental decisions, justiflies] "more thor-
oughgoing judicial review." 68
66. WHITMAN, The Eighteenth Presidency, in FURNESS, WALT WHITMAN'S WORK-
SHOP 92-95, 99 (1928).
67. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY VI, Pt. 2, Act 4, Sc. 2, Lines 83-84 (statement of
character Jack Cade).
68. Sive, Foreword- Roles and Rules in Environmental Decisionmaking, 62 IowA L.
REV. 637, 637 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
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The differences have narrowed, however, for three reasons.
First, the proportion of important cases determined strictly by de-
fining legal concepts, independent of findings of fact, has become
smaller. Second, the important litigated cases have now become
evenly divided between those in which the environmental interests
are seeking broader review, and those in which their adversaries,
the developmental interests, are seeking broader review. And
third, the federal agencies have grown in relative expertise in
making environmental decisions. With regard to the political
process, the differences arise from the large numbers of people
involved, and the corresponding frequency with which complex
environmental controversies which appear in the courts are also
subject to political decisions that may negate the judicial deci-
sions. Finally, the utility of civil disobedience to environmentalists
seems to be less than in other social movements because their legal
arm may not, without adversely affecting its credibility, simulta-
neously support judicial decisions which have favored environ-
mentalists and fight those which have gone against them.
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